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This paper allTIS to clarify the mechanism of temporal interpretation of 
sentences containing will (henceforth will-sentences) that appear as independent 
clauses. Will-sentences receive a number of interpretations, as in (1 ): I 
(1) a. I will be back before six. <Volition> 
b. It will rain tomorrow. <Future> 
c. That'll be the postman. <Predictability> 
d. Oil will float on water. <Propensity/Characteristic Behavior> 
In (1 a), will is usually regarded as expressing volition, and thus taken as a dynamic 
modal. When interpreted as expressing the future, as shown in (1 b), will is taken 
either as a future tense marker or auxiliary (e.g. Comrie (1985), Davidsen-Nielsen 
(1990), Declerck (1991, 20(6), Hornstein (1990), Klein (1994), Reichenbach (1947), 
Wekker (1976)), or as an epistemic modal which represents prediction (e.g. Collins 
(2009), Harder (1996), Huddleston (1995), Huddleston and Pullum (2002), Klinge 
(2005), Lyons (1977), N akau (1994), Pal mer (1990), Qui rk et a1. (1985)). The will 
Cll) in (1c) is regarded as an epistemic modal expressing predictability. In (Id), 
will is considered to express propensity or characteristic behavior, taken as a kind of 
dynamic modal. 
In accounting for the fact that more than one interpretation is possible with a 
given modal, two approaches are prevailing. One is the monosemous approach (e.g. 
Groefsema (1995), Haegeman (1989), Klinge (1993, 2005), Papafragou (1998)), and 
the other is the polysemous approach (e.g. Halliday (1970), Leech (1987, 2004), 
Palmer (1990, 200 I), Sawada (2006), Sweetser (1990)). Under the monosemous 
approach, will is a modal and has one core meaning. This core meaning interacts 
with other elements of a will-sentence and the context to give rise to a variety of 
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1 Tn this paper, such meanings as volition and predictability represented by will-sentences are 
not ascribed to will from the beginning, but considered to be derived as a resul! of interpreting the 
whole sentence. As shown later in the main text, will itself has its abstract core meaning, and a 
specific interpretive value of a will-sentence (e.g. volition, predictability) is determined as a result 
of the interaction between that abstract meaning and other factors (e.g. meanings of the other 
elements, the context) in the course of semantic and tense interpretation of the sentence. 
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pragmatic interpretations. Under the polysemous approach, will itself is associated 
with more than one semantic interpretation or meaning, including a fUlure tense 
marker. 
My approach is one which accommodates both approaches. It is based on a 
framework which combines the compositional theory of tense proposed by and 
developed in a series of Wada's studies (Wada (2001, 2009a, 2009b)) with a 
speaker-centered theory of modality. Within this framework, will is a modal 
auxiliary and has an abstract core meaning which will be reflected in the temporal 
structure of will-sentences in the process of interpretation. When a tense form, 
including a will-sentence, represents different temporal structures, their interpretive 
values are considered to be semantically different; when different interpretive values 
share one and the same temporal structure, they are pragmatic variants. Therefore, 
if the meaning of one specific will is associated with a different temporal structure 
from that of another will, then these two will's can be in a polysemous relationship: 
The two will's can be associated with two semantically different meanings. 
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly outlines the 
speaker-centered theory of modality. In section 3, I wiII survey the main points of 
Wada's compositional tense theory. Tn section 4, I will clarify the mechanism of 
temporal interpretation of will-sentences within the framework based on the two 
theories. Section 5 will offer concluding remarks. 
2. A Speaker-Centered Theory of Modality 
A theory of modality which this paper is based on necessarily involves the 
commitment of the speaker in interpreting a verbalized utterance. 2 This is because 
the mental attitude (state) of a speaker, the speaker's modality, is necessarily 
involved in any utterance or verbal activity. This theory of modality therefore 
assumes that when uttered, a sentence is necessarily decomposed semantically into 
two domains, as shown in (2): 
(2) Sentence (Utterance): Speaker's Attitude Domain + Proposition Domain)' 4 
2 Tn this paper, the term "speaker" is used as a cover term to include "thinker" or "writer"; in 
the same way, the term "hearer" is used as a cover term to include "reader" or "guesser." 
~ The term "speaker's attitude domain" in this paper was referred to as "modality domain" in 
Wada (200 I). The main reason for this change is because, for example, dynamic modality helongs 
to the proposition domain, and one might be confused with the terms "modality domain" and 
"modality." 
4 This semantic decomposition is basically related to Lyons's (1977) tripartite decomposition 
in the following manner: The speaker's attitude domain corresponds to both the neuslic (e.g. 
'T-say-so') and the tropic (e.g. 'it-is-so') domains, while the proposition domain corresponds to the 
phrastic ('propositional variable') domain. 
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Elements which belong to the speaker's attitude (SA) domain are modallties which 
represent the speaker's mental attitude toward persons and/or propositions holding 
at speech time (S). In other words, epistemic and deontic modality belong to the 
SA domain. On the other hand, elements which belong to the proposition (P) 
domain are modalities expressing the subject's internal property and/or state, 
commonly referred to as dynamic modality, as well as propositional content. 
For a better understanding of these statements, consider the following: 
(3) a. John may come. 
b. Mary can speak Japanese. 
Suppose that sentence (3a) is interpreted as "there is a possibility that John will 
come." In this case, may renects possibility modality, a speaker's mental altitude 
holding at S, and therefore belongs to the SA domain; 'John come' is an element to 
be described as propositional content, and therefore belongs to the P domain. 
Similarly, suppose that sentence (3b) is interpreted as "Mary has the ability to speak 
Japanese." In this case, 'Mary speak Japanese' constitutes propositional content, 
thus belonging to the P domain; since this can represents an ability (an internal state) 
of the subject, it by definition belongs to the P domain, too. 
One major characteristic deriving naturally from this theory of modality is that 
even sentences which are not marked explicitly by modal auxiliaries and/or adverbs 
can convey a certain modality. Consider (4): 
(4) a. John may be a spy. 
b. John is a spy. 
In both sentences, the propositional content 'John be a spy' belongs to the P domain. 
In (4a), may represents a possibility modality and belongs to the SA domain. In 
(4b), by contrast, there is no element that marks modality explicitly. Because of 
hypothesis (2), however, sentence (4b) is regarded as conveying a certain mental 
'attitude of the speaker. This type of mental attitude of the speaker is considered to 
be assertive modality or assertion, a kind of epistemic modality, because assertive 
modality is defined as follows: 
(5) Assertive modality is a mental attitude 111 which the speaker states the 
propositional content as a fact. 
Assertive modality is located at the strongest pole of the scale of the speaker's 
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commitment to the truth of the proposition (cf. Lyons (1977:808-809)). This 
modality is unmarked, and therefore conveyed by non-modalized declarative 
sentences, the unmarked type of sentences. s This is because when the speaker has 
no doubt about the truth of the propositional content that he or she is conveying to 
the addressee, he or she normally states it straightforwardly:fi Assertive modality 
semantically corresponds to "categorical (or modally unqualified) assertion" in 
Lyons's (1977) terms, used to express "straightforward statements of facL" 
My claim that non-modalized declarative sentences convey assertive modality 
is supported by the following sentence: 
(6) * Clark Kent is Superman, but then again he is not. (McDowell (1991:319)) 
By uttering the first conjunct, the speaker states as a fact that Clark Kent is 
Superman, but by uttering the second conjunct, he or she denies its truth. This 
leads to a contradiction; sentence (6) is unacceptable (cL McDowell (1991 )). 
Let us next consider another type of modality which plays a crucial role, 
namely predictive modality. I define it in (7), which is similar to Dancygier's 
(1998:45) "making the prediction on some sound epistemic basis." 
(7) Predictive modality is a mental attitude in which the speaker forecasts on a 
reasoned basis. 
The term "forecast" means "calculate or estimate something conjecturally" (cL also 
Close (1977: 131)): The term "on a reasoned basis" indicates "on the basis of 
observation, experience, scientific reason or something like that" (cf. The Free 
Online Dictionary by Farlex). Note that in this theory of modality, predictive 
modality or prediction can be made not only about the future but also about the 
present or the past (this idea is similar to thal of Leech (1987, 2004)).7 As we will 
5 While a great number of linguists do not regard non-modalized sentences as conveying 
modality, some take the same position as, or a similar position to, the one adopted in this paper. 
For example, Herslund (2005:42) classifies as neutral modality the modality represented by 
categorical sentences, sentences that do not contain any modal auxiliary or adverb. 
() The assertive modality adopted in this paper corresponds to the notion of "assertive point" 
adopted in Speech Act Theory (e.g. Searle (1979), Searle and Vanderveken (1985), McDowell 
(1991). Assertive point is one type of illocutionary point, and is a superordinate notion covering 
assertive illocutionary forces such as assertion, report, complaining, reminding, informing, and the 
like. Note, however, that prediction, an assertive illocutionary force in Speech Act Theory, is 
taken as predictive modality in the theory of modality adopted in this paper. Therefore, the 
notions of assertion and prediction in my sense correspond roughly to Boyd and Thorne's (1969) 
"statement" and "prediction," respectively. Note, in passing, that in McDowell (1991), sentences 
containing modal auxiliaries like must and may are considered to convey quasi-assertion. 
7 Many linguists (e.g. Bybee and Pagliuca (1987), Coates (1983), Declerck (1991, 2006)) 
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see in section 4, this modali ty is an epistemic modali ly which is associated wi th will 
in constructing a temporal structure of a will-sentence. 
3. A Compositional Theory of Tense 
Let us now turn to the compositional theory of tense proposed in Wada (200 I) 
and developed afterwards (e.g. Wada (2009a, 2009b)). The reason for adopting 
this theory is mainly twofold. First, several English tense phenomena have already 
been analyzed based on it. 8 Second, this tense theory provides an interpretive 
model in which the commitment of the speaker is indispensable in interpreting the 
temporal value of a given tense form, including temporal relations, aspectual value, 
and specification of the position of the time at or during which a situation (such as 
an action, event, state of affairs) holds or occurs, and in this sense has a great 
affinity for the speaker-centered theory of modality adopted in section 2. In what 
follows, I will outline the core parts of the tense theory. 
3. I. Tense Structure Level and Tense Interpretation Level 
First of all, this tense theory assumes two levels in the field of tense, the 
tense-structure (TS) level and the tense-interpretation (TI) level. The TS level is 
concerned with a general or schematic semantic structure of a tense form, which is 
called "tense structure." The TI level is an interface in which tense-structure 
information interacts with information from semantic, pragmatic and syntactic 
factors other than tense-structure information to reach a final temporal value in a 
particular linguistic environment. The semantic structure on this level is called 
"temporal structure." 
To illustrate this, consider, for example, a past tense form like the one in (8): 
(8) Bruce danced with Mary yesterday. 
The speaker chooses the past tense form danced because its tense structure is 
appropriate in order to convey to the hearer that the event of Bruce's dancing with 
Mary occurred in the past. The hearer identifies the temporal value of that past 
tense form by considering characteristics of the linguistic environment (including 
factors other than tense structure) in which it appears. More specifically, the hearer, 
regard the notion of prediction as equal to "future (tense)" or "the speaker's assertion that a 
proposition will be true in the future," which T do not follow. 
R For example, Wada (200 I) deals with a variety of issues concerning English present and 
past perfects, co-occurrence of English tense forms with temporal adverbials, comparisons between 
will and he going to, and tense phenomena in English indirect speech; Wada (2009a) makes 
comparisons between be going fO and present progressives with future time reference; and Wada 
(2009h) analyzes tense phenomena of perception verb complements in English and Japanese. 
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on the basis of the tense-structure information of the past tense form danced, 
constructs its temporal structure in his/her mind by taking into consideration such 
factors as syntactic properties of independent clauses and the presence of the 
temporal adverbial yesterday, and finally reaches the temporal value in which 
Bruce's dancing with Mary occurred at a particular time in the past, i.e. yesterday. 
3.2. Absolute Tense Component and Relative Tense Component 
Next, let me briefly describe two tense components contributing to tense 
structure: an A(bsolute tense)-component and an R(elative tense)-component. The 
tense-structure information associated with the A-component is represented by a 
tense morpheme that changes according to person, number, and mood 
(A-morpheme); the tense-structure information associated with the R-component is 
represented by a verb stem and, if any, a tense morpheme that does not change 
according to person, number, and mood (R-morpheme). 
For a better understanding of these notions, consider (9): 
(9) a. plays/played 
b. burninglburn 
( I 0) a. [R play] + [A -s ] / [R play] + [A -ed ] 
b. [R burn + -ing ] + [A ] / [R burn + 0 ] + [A 
The English present and past tense morphemes (represented by -5 and -ed 
respectively), as shown in (9a), are by definition A-morphemes. 9 The present 
participle marker -ing and the bare infinitive marker 0, as exemplified in (9b), are by 
definition R-morphemes. In this theory, a non-finite marker is taken as a kind of 
tense morpheme in that it can represent a non-deictic temporal relation. (lOa) and 
(10b) are semantic decompositions of (9a) and (9b) in terms of the two tense 
components. As is clear from (10), the two finite forms in English contain 
elements contributing to tense structure in both the A- and the R-component, while 
English non-finite forms contain such elements only in the R-component. 
9 In present-day English, it is usually the case that verb forms other than the third-person 
singular form in the indicative present tense do not show any verbal inflection explicitly. 
However, considering the fact that the third-person singular form in the indicative present tense 
shows such an inflection explicitly, I assume that such notions as tense, person, number, and mood 
are reflected even in verb forms that do not show verbal inflections explicitly. Thus, for example, 
in I play tennis, play is regarded as the first-person singular form in the indicative present tense; 
similarly, in I played tennis, played is regarded as the first-person singular form in the indicative 
past tense. Note that irregular conjugation verbs are also decomposed into an A-morpheme and 
verb stem at the TS level, as in: 
(i) went: [f{ go I + [A -ed J 
43 
3.3. Tense Structure and Temporal Structure 
I turn now to a description of tense and temporal structures of tense forms. 
Let me start by considering finite forms. The tense-structure information 
represented by an A-morpheme (associated with the A-component) is a Lime-sphere, 
a grammatical time-span whose value is determined based on its positional 
relationship to the speaker's temporal viewpoint (V SPK)' The speaker's temporal 
viewpoint is a pivot for grammatical time, and serves as a base for the speaker to 
choose a tense form (this corresponds to Janssen's (1996) "vantage point"). The 
past tense morpheme -ed represents a time-sphere excluding or prior to the speaker's 
temporal viewpoint, while the present tense morpheme -s represents a time-sphere 
including the speaker's temporal viewpoint. These time-spheres are referred to as 
the past time-sphere and the present time-sphere, respectively. 
The tense-structure information represented by a verb stem (associated with 
the R-component) is an event time (E), a time point or period at or during which the 
relevant part of a situation holds or occurs. In the case of finite verbs, only the 
verb stem is related to the R-component, and there is no R-morpheme, namely an 
element which explicitly expresses a relation between the event time and another 
time notion (cf. (10a)). An event time is connected to a time-sphere in a 
subordinate way in that the R-component is subordinate to the A-component; an 
event time occurs or holds in a time-sphere. 
From these observations, the tense structures of English two finite forms, 
present and past tense forms, are schematically represented as follows: 
A: 
'-_---.V-"'S-'-P'-'-K _--,I PRES 
I 
R: E 
Fig.l: (i) Tense Structure of 
Present Tense Form 
,-_~ ___ -,I PAST 
E 
(ii) Tense Structure of 
Past Tense Form 
V SPK 
A stands for the A-component; R for the R-component; a rectangle with subscript 
PRES for a present time-sphere; and a rectangle with subscript PAST for a past 
time-sphere. A horizontal line represents subsequence and a vertical line or comma 
indicates simultaneity or inclusion. 
As a first step of tense interpretation of these two finite forms, the starting 
point for the calculation of their temporal values must be set on the time line. In 
the default case, this starting point is speech time (S). The reason for this is as 
follows: The speaker's consciousness (CSPK), a part of the brain activated when 
uttering, thinking or cognizing something, is by definition always existent at S, and 
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the consciousness and deictic viewpoint of one and the same speaker share the same 
time and space in the default case. Therefore, in the default case, the speaker's 
temporal viewpoint (a kind of deictic viewpoint) fuses or combines with his/her 
consciousness and thus is situated on S. In this way, the past and the present 
time-spheres correspond to the past and the non-past time-areas (conceptual or real 
time-spans), respectively. 
PAST PAST 
AREA S(CSPK ) AREA S(CSPK ) 
I 
~ 
A: I PAST VSPK PRES 
R: E E 
Fig.2: (i) Temporal Structure of (i i) Temporal Structure of 
Present Tense Form Past Tense Form 
(Default Case) (Default Case) 
The temporal structures of the present and past tense forms In Figure 2 are their 
default ones. This correspondence between the time-spheres and time-areas is 
supported by the following paradigm. 
(II) a. Tom {loves/*loved} Yoko now. (Present Time Reference) 
b. The train {leaves/*left} at 5:30 tomorrow. (Future Time Reference) 
c. She {*plays/played} the flute yesterday. (Past Time Reference) 
As is clear from (11 ), present tense forms can refer to both the present and the future 
time-areas, but cannot refer to the past time-area (except for the historical present 
case); past tense forms refer only to the past time-area (except for the subjunctive 
case). 
The present and past tense forms can express temporal structures other than 
the default ones. For example, the present tense form of the historical present, as 
in Germany invades Poland in 1939, requires the speaker's temporal viewpoint to 
fuse with a time point in the past time-area, as shown in Figure 3 below. The 
temporal structure schematized in Figure 3 is one that the present tense form can 
represent. Note that in this tense theory, if a tense form has different temporal 




Fig. 3: Temporal Structure of Present Tense Form 
(Historical Present Case) 
45 
Let us next consider non-finite forms. As we saw above, each English 
non-finite form has its own R-morpheme, and the tense-structure information 
represented by an R-morpheme is a grammatical time relation between an event time 
and a time of orientation, namely an evaluation time whose position will on the TI 
level be determined based on characteristics of the relevant linguistic environment. 
Here, we consider, as a sample case, bare infinitives which appear in the 
complement position of the modal will. In my theory, the time-relational value of 
the bare infinitive marker 0 is unspecified (Wada (2001 :Ch.2, 2006); cf. also Duffley 
(1992)). In other words, a bare infinitive can represent all of the three possible 
lime relations between an event time and time of orientation on the TI level 
according to the linguistic environment in which it appears. 
Tn the complement position of modals, I follow Duffley (1992) to assume that 
the event time of a bare infinitive is simultaneous with or poslerior to the event time 
of the modal as time of orientation. To be more specific, in the case of stative 
situations (situations described by stative verbs or habitual/generic situations), the 
relation between the two times is that of either simultaneity or posteriority, while in 
the case of non-stative situations (single situations described by non-stative verbs), 
the lime relation is that of posteriority. This assumption is motivated in the 
following manner. A modal is generally assumed to represent potentiality and 
therefore construct a potential world extant at the time expressed by that modal and 
continuing thereafter. In this world, when the infinitive represents a stative 
situation, which has homogeneous properties, it is possible either that the situation 
in question already exists at the time of the modal or that it will exist at a later time; 
when the infinitive represents a non-stative situation, which has heterogeneous 
properties, it must be the case that it will occur· later than the time of the modal 
because a heterogeneous situation takes time to occur. 
Consider (12) for example: 
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(12) a. TofU may come. 
b. Yoko may be in her room. 
In (12a), because of the properties of the non-stative situation described by come, 
the time of coming is posterior to the time of may; in (12b), because of the 
properties of the stative situation described by be in her room, the lime of being in 
her room is either simultaneous with or posterior to the time of may. 
3.4. Other Explanatory Devices 
Before closing this section, we need to see two more explanatory devices. 
The first device is the following hypothesis. 
(13) Auxiliary as well as lexical verbs can express their own event times. lo 
Under this hypothesis, sentence (12a), for example, contains two event times, the 
event time of the modal auxiliary mayas well as that of the lexical verb come. 
The second device is the notion of temporal focus. This notion is defined as 
a focus located on (part of) an event time in the temporal structure of a tense form 
when the speaker pays special attention to it. 
4. An Analysis of Will-Sentences 
4.1. Outline of Temporal Interpretation of Will-Sentences 
Having surveyed what is necessary for analyzing the mechanism of temporal 
interpretation of will-sentences, we can start a concrete analysis thereof. I wi 11 take 
up the following six as interpretive values of will-sentences (1 am not considering 
(14) as an exhaustive list, though). 
(14) a. Volitional Future 
b. Predictive Future 
c. Simple Future 
d. Predictability/Predictive Present 
e. Propensi ty/Characteristic Behavior 
f. Order 
As noted above, while will-sentences with different temporal structures are taken as 
10 Other studies of Engl ish tenses based on this hypothesis are, for example, Janssen (1996) 
and Nakau (1994). My theory owes much especially to the latter in this respect. 
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expressmg different semantic interpretations, will-sentences which have different 
interpretations, but share one and the same temporal structure, express pragmatically 
different ones. On this basis, 1 will show, from section 4.2 on, that interpretive 
values (14a-e) are semantically different interpretations because their temporal 
structures are different, whereas (140 is a pragmatic variant of (14b) because the 
temporal structures of the two cases are the same. Before going further, however, T 
will provide a general outline of temporal interpretation of will-sentences. 
Let me start by considering the abstract core meaning of will. 
(15) Abstract Core Meaning of Will: High Probability of Occurrence/Existence 
This meaning of will is defined based on Palmer's statement that will "indicates 
what is a reasonable conclusion" (Palmer (1990:57-58)); what is reasonably 
concluded is very likely to occur or hold. 
Within my framework, will is a present tense form and therefore has the tense 
structure represented by Figure I (i) above, while the tense structure of a bare 
infinitive is unspecified. At the TI level, the temporal structure of will-sentences 
reflects both of the tense structures of will and a bare infinitive. In the course of 
tense interpretation, a given will-sentence is interpreted as expressing one of the six 
interpretations in (14) after the calculation of the meanings of will and other 
elements (including the bare infinitive) under the influence of the linguistic 
environment in which the sentence occurs. In this way, the type of temporal 
structure of will-sentences is determined. The abstract core meaning of will shown 
in (15) is reflected in each of the determined temporal structures in some way or 
other, but the will's associated with these temporal structures can be interpreted as 
expressing specific meanings ascribed to themselves (e.g. volition, predictability) in 
the course of temporal calculation; if these specific meanings are semantically 
different, they are in a polysemous relationship with one another. 
Since this paper considers will-sentences in the present tense form which 
appear as independent clauses and do not serve as historical presents, the will has the 
default temporal structure in Figure 2(i) above. The speaker's temporal viewpoint, 
included in the tense structure of will as finite form, is located on speech lime 
because of the fusion of the speaker's temporal viewpoint and consciousness, and 
therefore the event time of will holds or occurs in the non-past time area, namely the 
present or future time area. However, by virtue of the definition of modality stated 
in section 2, this event time of will must hold at speech time. The temporal value 
that a will-sentence expresses depends crucially on the situation type of the bare 
infinitive, for the bare infinitive, appearing in the complement position of will after 
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its combination with the latter, indicates either simultaneity or posteriority In 
relation to the event time of will as the time of orientation according to the situation 
type it describes (stative vs. non-stative situations). For the sake of convenience, I 
will refer to the event time of will as EI and that of the bare infinitive as E2 from 
now on. Note that what type of temporal structure a will-sentence represents 
depends not only on the infinitive's situation type, but also on the controllability of 
the infinitive's situation, the person type of the subject, and time adverbials. 
4.2. Volitional Future 
Let me now analyze the mechanism of each interpretation in (14) one by one. 
I will begin with the case of volitional future. Observe (16): 
(16) a. I will be back before six. 
b. I WILL solve this problem. 
c. I will write tomorrow. 
(Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 192)) 
(Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 193)) 
(Klinge (2005: 174)) 
In each example in (16), the situation described by the bare infinitive is that of a 
controllable type, and the subject is first-person; a volitional interpretation is 
naturally obtained. In the process of tense interpretation of these will-sentences, 
the notion of volition is ascribed to will and thus this will is taken as expressing 
dynamic modality. Because dynamic modality expresses the internal property or 
state of condition of the subject holding at speech time (in the case of present tense) 
and volition is part of a human's present state of mind (Leech (2004:62)), EI (the 
event time of f,vill) is interpreted as simultaneous with speech time. Since volition 
means something like "a decision to pursue a plan in mind," the situation described 
by the bare infinitive is naturally taken as coming in the future relative to the time at 
which the volition occurred. Moreover, the existence of the future-time adverbs 
be.f<Jre six and tomorrow in (16a, c) and the non-stative situations described by the 
bare infinitives in (16b, c) helps us to reach a posterior relationship of E2 (the event 
time of the bare infinitive) to E I . Therefore, the will-sentences in (16) are instances 
of volitional future. That a subject referent has a will to pursue an infinitive's 
situation means that the situation is very likely to occur. This is comparable to 
laszczolt's (2009:59) statement that "strong intentionality results in strong 
probability." Therefore, will-sentences of volitional future reflect the abstract 
meaning of will stated in (15). 
Based on these observations, the temporal structure of will-sentences of 
voli tional future is schematically represented as follows: II 
II As to the volitional interpretation in the sense of this paper, Leech (1987,2004) divides it 
A: 
R: 






(bare i nfi ni Live) 
Fig.4: Temporal Structure of Will-Sentences of Volitional Future 
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The reason why the temporal focus (TF) is put on E, is that the will in this type of 
sentence is related with the notion of volition; EI is viewed as more important than 
E2 (associated with the infinitive's situation) in that the occurrence or the infinitive's 
situation is subject to the presence of the volition. This property of volition is also 
supported by the fact that volitional ~vill can be stressed, as shown by (16b). 
Since E, is associated with volition, a type of dynamic modality, it is, by 
definition, an element belonging to the proposition (P) domain. Since the 
infinitive's situation associated with E2 is a propositional element, it belongs to the P 
domain, too. These suggest that there is no explicitly expressed element belonging 
to the speaker's attitude (SA) domain in will-sentences of volitional future, and 
therefore, this domain is occupied by the unmarked modality, assertive modality, for 
the reason stated in section 2. Thus, will-sentences of voh tional future are 
semantically decomposed in the following manner: 
(17) Will-Sentences of Volitional Future: 
[SA assertion] + [p volition (E I) + infinitive situation (E::) ] 
4.3. Predictive Future 
Let us next consider the case of predictive future. Will-sentences are 
interpreted as expressing predictive future \vhen the speaker makes a prediction 
about the occurrence or existence of a future situation. By "prediction," I mean 
predictive modality, defined in (7) above. Because of this definition of prediction 
infO three Iypes: intention (=intermediate volition), willingness (=weak yolition), and insistence 
(=strong volition). Within the framework of this paper, these three interpretations are pragmatic 
variants of the volitional future that share the same temporal structure. Cf. also Coates (1983). 
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or predictive modality, it is based on the speaker's subjective judgment or 
evaluation~ 12 the conjectural estimate of future situations is in nature subjective, 
even if on a reasoned basis. This suggests that the propositional content of 
will-sentences of predictive future must be the one which deserves the speaker's 
subjective judgment or evaluation. Put differently, will-sentences whose 
propositional content does not deserve the speaker's subjective judgment or 
evaluation are not interpreted as those of predictive future; they are interpreted as 
will-sentences of "simple future," which we will return to in the next sub-section. 
For this reason, I distinguish predictive future from simple future, although they are 
both usually subsumed under the term "simple/pure future" in the literature. 
Now, consider (18): 
(18) a. She wi 11 beat him easi ly. (Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 188» 
b. It wi 11 rain tomorrow. 
c. Tomorrow's weather will be cold and cloudy. (Klinge (2005:174») 
From the fact that the subject is third-person in each sentence in (18) and the fact 
that the situation described by the bare infinitive is what human beings cannot 
control in (I8b, c), we tend to regard the speaker of these sentences as making a 
prediction. In fact, the propositional content of these will-sentences deserves the 
speaker's subjective judgment or evaluation. Thus, in constructing the temporal 
structure of these will-sentences, will is viewed as representing prediction, a type of 
epistemic modality. Because epistemic modality expresses the degree of the 
speaker's commitment to the truth of the target situation at the time of judgment or 
evaluation, EI (the event time of will) is interpreted as simultaneous with speech 
time. From the fact that the infinitive's situation is usually viewed as a non-stative 
type in (18a, b) and a future time expression is extant in (18b, c), E2 (the event time 
of the bare infinitive) is taken as posterior to E!. As a result, E2 comes in the future 
time-area. Therefore, these will-sentences are instances of predictive future. 
The definition of predictive modality in (7) enables us to say that the speaker 
(subjectively) views the predicted situation as very likely to occur or hold, for the 
situation forecast on a reasoned basis can be viewed as likely to occur or hold, and 
thus, such a situation is at least not incompatible with the notion of high probability 
of occurrence or existence. 13 In this sense, we can say that will-sentences of 
12 This is compatible with Leech's (2004:56) statement that prediction is "something 
involving the speaker's judgment." 
13 The degree of high probability of will-sentences of volitional future seems to be higher 
than that of will-sentences of predictive future. I assume that the notion of high probability covers 
some range of the higher degree on the probability scale. From this assumption, we can attribute 
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predictive future reflect the abstract meaning of HJill stated in (15). 
Based on the observations made above, the temporal struclUre of 
will-sentences of predictive future is schematically represented as follows: 
A: 
R: 







Fig.5: Temporal Structure of Will-Sentences of Predictive Future 
In Figure 5, E 1, enclosed in a square with subscript SA, indicates that the relevant 
situation belongs to the speaker's attitude (SA) domain; all the elements without an 
SA square belong to the proposition (P) domain. 
To see the reason why the temporal focus (TF) is put on E2, let us first 
consider the semantic decomposition of will-sentences of predictive future. 
(19) Will-Sentences of Predictive Future: 
[SA prediction (E 1) ] + [p infinitive situation (E2) ] 
Since El is associated with predictive modality, a type of epistemic modality, it is by 
definition an element belonging to the SA domain (see section 2). On the other 
hand, since E2 is associated with the bare infinitive, a propositional element, it 
belongs to the P domain. 
Now, the reason why the temporal focus is put on E2 in Figure 5 is justified in 
the following manner. The target of focus is basically part of what is described by 
the speaker. Since prediction is a speaker's attitude element, it does not constitute 
what is described, propositional content. Thus, El cannot be the target of temporal 
focus, and therefore, the temporal focus is directed to E2, the other possibili ty. 
As is clear from Figures 4 and 5 above, the temporal structure of 
such a difference in degree concerning high probability to factors like the notional difference 
between volition and prediction, as far as the degree of high probability of both notions is confined 
to that range. 
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will-sentences of predictive future is different from that of will-sentences of 
volitional future. Therefore, these two interpretations are semantically different. 
4.4. Simple Future 
Now, I will move to will-sentences of simple future. The term "simple 
future" in this paper corresponds to Close's (1977: 132) "statement of future fact." 
As indicated at the beginning of the previous sub-section, will-sentences are 
interpreted as expressing simple future when the infinitive's situation occurring or 
holding in the future does not deserve the speaker's subjective judgment or 
evaluation. In other words, the propositional content of will-sentences of simple 
future is considered to occur or hold in the future as a matter of course and its 
occurrence or existence in the future is out of the "scope" of the speaker's subjective 
involvement. Subsumed under this type of situation are cases of someone 
becoming a certain age and referring to calendar dates in the future. 
We can provide a test to distinguish the propositional content of the 
simple-future interpretation from that of the predictive-future interpretation: If 
there is some doubt as to whether the propositional content of will-sentences itself 
will occur or become reality (e.g. whether it will rain tomorrow), then such a 
will-sentence is a predictive-future type; if not, it is a simple-future type. 14 
To illustrate the point, consider (20) for example: 
(20) a. He will be two tomorrow. (Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 190» 
b. Tomorrow will be Sunday. 
c. There will be a public holiday on Friday. (Close (1977:132» 
The subject referent's becoming the age of two ((20a», tomorrow's being Sunday 
((20b», and a certain Friday being a public holiday ((20c» all do not deserve the 
speaker's subjective judgment or evaluation. These propositions are interpreted as 
future situations that occur or hold as a matter of course; there is no doubt as to 
whether they will be true in the future. It is only in these cases that T regard 
will-sentences as expressing simple future. 
What is important here is that will in the simple-future case is interpreted not 
as representing prediction, let alone volition, but as representing a very schematic 
situation that virtually functions merely as a "placeholder" or a "waypoinl" from 
which the infinitive's situation is evaluated. The situation associated with this will 
is regarded as extremely semantical1y bleached .. Thus, in the temporal structure of 
will-sentences of simple future, the event time of will functions solely as the time of 
14 T thank Yukio Hirose for bringing this point to my attention. 
53 
orientation for the event time of the infinitive's situation. In my tense theory, this 
type of event lime is called "orientational event time" or EO. However, this will 
can be viewed as a "remnant" of an epistemic modal, because the simple-future 
interpretation can be counted as a special case of the predictive-future one in that the 
propositional content of the fortner, a future situation which does not deserve the 
speaker's subjective judgment or evaluation, is often difficult to distinguish from a 
future situation with a very low degree of subjectivity in the speaker's judgment or 
evaluation. I'; This seems to be why these two interpretations are usually 
categorized into the same group in the literature, as we saw above. Therefore, EO I , 
the orientational event time of this type of will-sentence, holds at speech time. 
Which event time, then, is the temporal focus directed to? Because an 
orientational evenl lime is associated with a virtually contentless or very schematic 
situation, it cannot be the target of focus because such a situation normally does not 
receive any attention. Therefore, the temporal focus is directed to E2, the event 
time of the bare infinitive. Future situations described by will-sentences of simple 
future are extremely likely to occur or hold because they are considered to occur or 
hold as a matter of course without the speaker's involvement. This type of 
will-sentence thus reflects the abstract meaning of will in (15). 
From the observations made above, the temporal structure of will-sentences of 
simple future is schematized as follows: 





Fig.6: Temporal Structure of Will-Sentences of Simple Future 
Tn Figure 6, the event time of }vill functions solely as time of orientation, and the 
will in question virtually does not express any specific mental altitude (state) of the 
15 Simple future H'ill in my sense thus corresponds to Collins's (2009: 128) minimal degree of 
prediction or what Declerck (2006) calls "the least subjectified" case of prediction. However, 
what is to be emphasized is that such a notion is not due to a specific modality associated with I-l'ill 
from the beginning, but is derived from the temporal structure of simple future will-sentences. 
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speaker. I therefore argue that this will is viewed not as belonging to the SA 
domain, but as part of what is described by the speaker, belonging to the P domain. 
Since will-sentences of simple future contain no explicit element belonging to the 
SA domain, the domain is occupied by the unmarked modality, assertive modality. 
The semantic decomposition of will-sentences of simple future is schematized 
as follows: 
(21) Will-Sentences of Simple Future: 
[SA assertion] + [p < > (Eo]) + infinitive situation (E2) ] 
The symbol < > means "placeholder." Since the temporal structure in Figure 6 is 
different from those in Figures 4 and 5, the simple-future interpretation is semantic. 
My claim that in the simple-future interpretation the situation described by 
will is merely a placeholder or a waypoint is supported by the fact that the 
will-sentences in (20) above can be paraphrased as the sentences without will in (22) 
(cL Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 190), Collins (2009: 128), among others). 
(22) a. He is two tomorrow. (Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 190» 
b. Tomorrow is Sunday. 
c. There is a public holiday on Friday. (Close (1977: 134» 
In this connection, Close (1977: 134) points out that the will-sentences express future 
events that will certainly occur, while the sentences without will express present 
certainty. The temporal structure-based analysis shown above can explain this 
point in the following manner. Both types of sentences convey assertion holding at 
speech time. However, since the will-sentences in (20) contain EO I in their 
temporal structure, the semantic content associated with E2 (posterior to EO]) is not a 
direct target of assertion holding at speech time, and futurity (E2 coming later than 
EO]) is foregrounded in interpreting these will-sentences (note that EO in essence 
cannot be foregrounded). On the other hand, since the sentences without will in 
(22) contain only one event time in their temporal structure and the semantic content 
associated with that event time is a direct target of assertion holding at speech time, 
presentness (E concurrent with S) is foregrounded in interpreting these sentences. 
4.5. Predictability/Predictive Present 
Let us next consider will-sentences of predictability or what I call predictive 
present. This interpretation is basically the same as the predictive-future 
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interpretation except that what is predicted holds in the present time. 16 Consider: 
(23) a. [Knock on door] That will be the plumber. 
(Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 188)) 
b. That will be the milkman. (Klinge (2005: 174)) 
c. John will be in his office. (Palmer (1988: 137)) 
In these will-sentences, the subjects are third-person, and the bare infinitives are 
taken as describing uncontrollable stative situations. Therefore, it is possible to 
interpret these sentences as indicating that, as Leech (2004:86) suggests, the speaker 
makes a prediction about a situation holding in the present time-area (recall that the 
bare infinitive fonowing a modal can receive a simultaneous reading). For the 
compatibility between this type of will-sentence and the abstract meaning of will in 
(15), we have already seen in section 4.3 that will-sentences with predictive nuances 
reflect the latter. 
On the basis of these observations, we can schematical1y represent the 
temporal structure of will-sentences of predictive present below. 
A: 
R: 
'--__ V .. S:::.;.P...:..:K"--_--' PRES 
E2 ~SA 
(will) (bare infinitive) 
t 
TF 
Fig.7: Temporal Structure of Will-Sentences of Predictive Present 
Since the temporal structure in Figure 7 is different from any of the three temporal 
structures we have already seen, the predictive-present interpretation is semantic. 
The semantic decomposition of this type of will-sentence is as fol1ows: 
16 Supporting evidence for the view that not only predictive future will hut also 
predictability/predictive present will can express epistemic modality is as follows: Both co-occur 
with the epistemic modal adverb probably; both can be followed by the perfect form or the 
progressive form. Volitional will does not show these grammatical phenomena. See Collins 
(2009: 128-129) for details. 
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(24) Will-Sentences of Predictive Present: 
[SA prediction (E I)] + [p infinitive situation (E2)] 
4.6. Propensity/Characteristic Behavior 
Now, I turn to the case of propensity or characteristic behavior. This 
interpretation is similar to the predictive-present one in that the infinitive's situation 
holds in the present time-area. In fact, Leech (1987,2004) classifies both or them 
into the same category. However, one crucial difference between them is that 
while the infinitive's situation is unique/singular in the predictive-present 
interpretation, it consists of sub-situations of the same kind 111 the 
propensity/characteristic behavior interpretation. When the same kind of situation 
occurs or holds repeatedly, it comes to express a propensity/characteristic behavior 
of the subject referent involved in that situation. 




Oil will float on water. 
He'll go all day without eating. 
Boys will be boys. 
(Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 194)) 
(Klinge (2005:174)) 
(Lakoff (1970:848)) 
Leech (2004:86) states that a prediction made about a present situation can be 
extended to include general or habitual predictions (he calls this type of prediction 
"predictability"). He also states that will-sentences of propensity/characteristic 
behavior are paraphrasable by the following formula: Whenever x happens, it is 
predictable that y happens. Based on these statements, I conclude that this type of 
will-sentence indicates the speaker's prediction that if we try the same type of event 
repeatedly, we will see the same result repeatedly. 17, IR Tn constructing the 
temporal struclure of these will-sentences, the notion of "bei ng predictable," a kind 
\7 My view on propensity/characteristic behavior yvill is thus different from Palmer's 
(1988: 136) view that habitual/characteristic H'ill, the correspondent of propensity/characteristic 
behavior 11'ill in my terms, is a type of dynamic modality. Tn my analysis, habitual/characteristic 
overtones are not attributed to }rill itself, but derive from the infinitive's situation which consists of 
sub-situations of the same kind. This claim is supported by the fact that sentences without will 
can also receive the habitual/characteristic interpretation when the same situation's occurring or 
holding repeatedly leads to the same result (cr. Leech (1987,2004». 
(i) a. Oil floats on water. 
h. A kiss is still a kiss in Casablanca. 
(Leech (2004:87») 
But a kiss is not a kiss without your sigh. 
(cited from Bertie Higgins's 'Casablanca') 
Tn these sentences, the relevant modality is assertion. 
IR A similar explanation is suggested by Boyd and Thorne (1969:64-65) in terms of Speech 
Act Theory. 
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of prediction, is ascribed to the modal 'will, which by definition holds at speech time~ 
the infinitive's situation, which is stative because it is a habitual or general one, can 
be interpreted as simultaneous with the time of prediction, as the formula above 
indicates. The view that will in will-sentences of propensity/characteristic behavior 
is associated with predictive modality can be supported by the fact that the will in 
question cannot be stressed, which is analogous to how will cannot be stressed in 
will-sentences of predictive future or present (cf. Leech (2004:86)). For this reason, 
the l'vill-sentences under consideration also reflect the abstract meaning of will in 
(15). From these observations, the temporal structure of will-sentences of 
propensity/characteristic behavior is schematized in Figure 8: 
A: 
R: 






Fig.8: Temporal Structure of Will-Sentences of Propensity/ 
Characteristic Behavior 
What is to be noted here is that this temporal structure does not contain 
temporal focus. First, for the reason we have seen already, the temporal focus is 
not directed toward E I . Second, the infinitive's situation (associated with E 2) 
consists of sub-situations (represented by ESUH ) of the same type which are not 
intended to be connected to specific times, so the infinitive's situation as a whole is 
indefinite; the temporal focus is not put on E2, either. Hence the lack of temporal 
focus. Since this temporal structure is different from any of (he four 
aforementioned ones, this type of will-sentence receives an independent semantic 
i nterprelation. 
This type of will-sentence is semantically decomposed as in (26): 
(26) Will-Sentences of Propensity/Characteristic Behavior: 
[SA prediction (E I ) ] + [p infinitive situation consisting of sub-situations of 
the same type (E2) ] 
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4.7. Order 
Finally, I will consider will-sentences with the sense of order or instruction. 
Examples of this lype of will-sentence are given in (27). 
(27) a. You will report back for duty on Friday morning. 
(Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 194» 
b. You will do as I will tell you. (Klinge (2005: 174» 
c. Private Jones will report at 08:00 hrs. (Palmer (1990:142» 
I follow Huddleston and Pullum (2002) to argue that the sense in question is a 
matter of implicature. This can be supported by the fact that these will-sentences 
can be interpreted as expressing the speaker's prediction about the addressee's 
action in the future. Consider the will-sentence in a discourse like (28): 
(28) "You're driving like a maniac," Jenny said. 
"This is Boston," I replied. "Everyone drives like a maniac." We were 
halted for a red light on Route 1 at the lime. 
"You'II ki II us before your parents can murder us." 
(E. Segal, Love Story, p.60) 
This will-sentence is uttered by a young lady to her fiance when they are driving to 
see the man's parents. From this discourse, it is clear that the sense of order is nOl 
found in the will-sentence in question. 
I therefore claim that will-sentences like those in (27) wil1 be interpreted with 
respect to order only in a context where the speaker has the authority to require the 
addressee or someone else to do something the way the former wants, and predicts 
that that situation will come true (Huddleston and Pu11um (2002); cf. also Leech 
(2004) and Klinge (2005». These will-sentences are considered to have the same 
temporal structure and semantic decomposition as those of predictive future (see 
Figure 5 and (19) in section 4.3), and therefore are a pragmatic variant of the latter. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has shown that by combining the theory of modality seen in 
section 2 with the compositional theory of tense surveyed in section 3, we can 
analyze the mechanism of temporal interpretation of vvill-sentences systematical1y. 
On the level of tense interpretation, will-sentences which have different temporal 
structures are taken as expressing di fferent semantic interpretations, while 
will-sentences which have different interpretations, but share one and the same 
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temporal structure, express pragmatically different interpretations. The SlX 
interpretations of will-sentences considered in this paper are summed up in Table 1. 
Semantic Interpretation Pragmatic Variant 
1 Volitional Future 
2 Predictive Future Order 
3 Simple Future 
4 Predictability/Predictive Present 
5 Propensity/Characteristic Behavior 
Table I: Semantic and Pragmatic Interpretations of lVill-Sentences 
The addressee is assumed to arrive at any of the five semantic interpretations 
as a result of utilizing one of the temporal interpretation processes shown in section 
4. The temporal structure of each interpretation in some way reflects the abstract 
core meaning of will in (15). The speaker utters a sentence in the form Vllill + 
infinitive assuming that the addressee will go through the semantic and temporal 
interpretation process to reach the finally-determined interpretive value that the 
speaker intends to convey. While will has its abstract core meaning, it can 
represent either volition (Volitional Future), prediction (Predictive Future, Predictive 
Present, Propensity/Characteristic Behavior, Order), or merely "placeholder" 
(Simple Future) in the semantic decomposition which is assumed to be pursued in 
the process of semantic and temporal interpretation of a given will-sentence. In 
this way, my analysis of will-sentences accommodates the monosemous and 
polysemous approaches mentioned in the Introduction. 
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